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STARTING FROM SCRATCH: THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT REPORTER-SOURCE PRIVILEGE AND THE
DOCTRINE OF INCIDENTAL RESTRICTIONS
Marcus A. Asner*
In the fall of 1991, University of Oklahoma Law Professor
Anita Hill submitted a confidential affidavit to the Senate
Judiciary Committee in which she accused Supreme Court
nominee Clarence Thomas of sexually harassing her when
the two had worked together at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.1 Her accusation did not remain
secret for long. Two reporters, Nina Totenberg of National
Public Radio and Timothy Phelps of Newsday, learned of
Hill's charges shortly after she made them. When Totenberg
and Phelps broke the story two days before the Senate was
scheduled to vote on Thomas's nomination,2 a national debate
erupted over both the truth of Hill's allegations and sexual
harassment in general. The substance of Hill's accusations
was not the only source of controversy, however. Several
senators also expressed outrage that Hill's confidential state-
ments had made their way to the press.3 These senators
demanded that the reporters' sources be uncovered and,
presumably, disciplined.4
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1. Neil A. Lewis, Law Professor Accuses Thomas of Sexual Harassment in
1980s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at Al.
2. Id. at A14.
3. Glenn R. Simpson, Senators May Meet This Week to Pick Leak Counsel, ROLL
CALL, Oct. 28, 1991, at 1. Senators John Seymour (R-Cal.) and Hank Brown (R-
Colo.) led the charge for an investigation of the leak. Id. at 21. Democratic leaders
also claimed credit for beginning the inquiry. Id.
4. Neil A. Lewis, Second Reporter Silent in Senate Leak Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1992, at A13 [hereinafter Lewis, Second Reporter]; see also Helen Dewar,
NPR Reporter Won't Reveal Sources, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1992, at A4; William J.
Eaton, Reporter Won't Name Sources of Thomas Article, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992,
at A20; Neil A. Lewis, Constitutional Test Is Seen in Inquiry on Leak to Press, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at B8 [hereinafter Lewis, Constitutional Test].
Attorney Floyd Abrams, who represented Nina Totenberg in the case, argued
that even if a Senate employee had leaked the information, it was neither a crime
nor a violation of Senate rules for a Senate employee to pass the information on to
a reporter. Id.
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The Senate appointed Peter E. Fleming Jr. as a special
counsel to investigate how Totenberg and Phelps obtained
the confidential information.5  Both reporters refused to
cooperate with Fleming's investigation, and claimed a First
Amendment right to keep the identities of their informants
secret.6 Because the standoff between these reporters and
the Senate ended when the Senate Rules Committee refused
to enforce Fleming's subpoenas,7 the Senate avoided
addressing squarely Totenberg's and Phelp's claim of
privilege. Nonetheless, this confrontation once again raised
the controversial issue of whether reporters should enjoy a
First Amendment privilege not to reveal a source's identity.
8
This Note examines reporters' claims to a First Amend-
ment reporter-source privilege in light of First Amendment
doctrine as a whole. Part I briefly explains the current state
of reporter-source privileges and the policies behind them.
Part II then attempts to identify doctrinal support for the
press's claim to a First Amendment privilege. Part II rejects
the notion that the First Amendment affords special protection
to the press as an institution. A reporter's status as a member
of the institutional media is not irrelevant, however, and the
well-established principle that the government may not target
or single out the press for discriminatory treatment becomes
the first cornerstone of the privilege proposed in Part V. Part
II then analyzes claims to a reporter-source privilege in light
of the incidental restrictions doctrine set forth in Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc.9 Part II concludes that a reporter-source
5. Dewar, supra note 4, at A4; Lawyer to Investigate Source of Disclosures,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1991, at A10.
6. Kenneth J. Cooper, Reporter Rebuffs Senate Counsel Investigating Leaks in
Hill-Thomas Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1992, at A6; Dewar, supra note 4, at A4;
Eaton, supra note 4, at A20; Lewis, Second Reporter, supra note 4, at A13. In
refusing to cooperate with Fleming's investigation, Totenberg stated that "to
subpoena reporters-and thus to threaten them with prison- . . [is] akin to the
Sedition Act of 1798." Dewar, supra note 4, at A4.
7. Helen Dewar, Senate Counsel Loses Bid For Reporter's Testimony, WASH.
POST, Mar. 26, 1992, at Al. The Rules Committee also refused to force the reporters
to turn over records of their telephone calls. Id. at A12. Fleming ultimately was
unable to determine how Totenberg and Phelps had gotten their stories. Helen
Dewar, Senate Probe Fails to Identify Leakers, WASH. POST, May 6, 1992, at A3; Neil
A. Lewis, Inquiry Fails to Find Source of Leak at Thomas Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, May
6, 1992, at A18; Jack Sirica, Probe for Leak in Hill Case Comes Up Dry, NEWSDAY,
May 6, 1992, at 30. Totenberg described Fleming's effort as a "fool's errand." Id.,
at 30.
8. See Lewis, Constitutional Test, supra note 4, at B8.
9. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
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privilege may be justified where reporters can show that
compelling the disclosure of sources' identities (1) has a high
impact on their First Amendment rights or (2) penalizes
communicative activity.
Part III focuses on the first prong of the Cloud Books test
and concludes that reporters will be unable to prove that
compelling disclosure of their sources has a "high impact" on
their First Amendment rights. Although reporters claim that
the possibility of compelled disclosure will have a chilling
effect on their activities, Part III argues that reporters
probably will not be able to establish this claimed chilling
effect with enough certainty to meet the requirements of the
first part of the Cloud Books test.
Part IV considers the second prong of the Cloud Books test
and argues that although the "penalization" prong may be
difficult to apply on a case-by-case basis, this prong should
protect the reporter-source relationship when it is the report-
er's speech that is singled out for punishment rather than the
reporter's knowledge of the .source's identity. The principle
that the government may not penalize a reporter's speech is
the second cornerstone of the privilege proposed in Part V.
Part V draws upon the two principles distilled from First
Amendment doctrine in Parts II and IV to propose an analyt-
ical framework in which to evaluate claims to a First Amend-
ment reporter-source privilege. Part V rejects the idea of an
ad hoc application of these principles because a clearer test
would save judicial time and avoid inconsistent results. Part
V then demonstrates how the proposed test modifies and
improves on the analysis favored by the circuit courts.
Finally, Part V argues that a reporter should be protected by a
qualified privilege only when the government moves to compel
her source's identity.
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF REPORTER-SOURCE PRIVILEGES
Journalists tend to hold their vows of confidentiality
sacred," claiming that confidential sources11 are vital to the
10. See, e.g., American Newspaper Guild Code of Ethics, reprinted in THE PRESS
AND SOcIETY 591-92 (George L. Bird & Frederic E. Merwin eds., 1951) (stating that
.newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose sources of confidential
information in court or before other judicial or investigating bodies").
11. There are various reasons why sources might desire anonymity. See, e.g.,
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process of gathering and reporting the news.'2 Many reporters
have chosen to defy court-ordered disclosure and go to jail
rather than to reveal their sources' identities. 13 A journalist's
desire for confidentiality, however, sometimes can conflict with
a litigant's need to discover and present all relevant evidence
in court. The general rule is that litigants have "a right to
every man's evidence." 4  Testimonial privileges are an
Branzburg.v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) ("Such informants presumably desire
anonymity in order to avoid being entangled as a witness in a criminal trial or
grand jury investigation. They may fear that disclosure will threaten their job
security or personal safety or that it will simply result in dishonor or embarrass-
ment."). For example, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991), an
informant was fired from his job on the same day that the newspapers revealed his
identity. Id. at 2516. See also Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis
of the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25
ARiz. L. REV. 815, 815 (1983); Lisa Kloppenberg, Note, Disclosure of Confidential
Sources in International Reporting, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (1987); Marian E.
Lindberg, Note, Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 338, 341 & n.25 (1981).
12. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-94 (noting that some journalists rely a
great deal on confidential sources and that some informants may be silenced if
there is a threat of exposure). See generally Vince Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:
An Empirical Study, 70 MicH. L. REV. 229, 245-46 (1971) (discussing the various
ways confidential sources are used by journalists); Monica Langley & Lee Levine,
Branzburg Revisited: Confidential Sources and First Amendment Values, 57 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 13, 26 (1988) (noting that "[a] pledge of confidentiality is... typically
the price that a journalist must pay to secure meaningful information about the
operation of government for dissemination to the public"); Marcus, supra note 11, at
815-16; John E. Osborn, The Reporter's Confidentiality Privilege: Updating the
Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 57,
64-67 (1985) (reviewing important news stories and comments from respected
journalists on how a confidentiality privilege made the newsgathering possible);
Michael Dicke, Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on
News Source Recovery for Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV.
1553, 1553 (1989); Kloppenburg, supra note 11, at 1636-37; Lindberg, supra note
11, at 339-41; Sharon K. Malheiro, Note, The Journalist's Reportorial Privi-
lege-What Does It Protect and What Are Its Limits?, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 79, 84
(1988-89).
13. Marcus, supra note 11, at 816-18; Lindberg, supra note 11, at 338 & n.1.
Press lore is replete with stories of reporters willing to pay fines, face contempt
citations, or spend time in jail rather than reveal the names of their sources.
Marcus, supra note 11, at 817-18; Kloppenberg, supra note 11, at 1639; Lindberg,
supra note 11, at 338-39. In 1990, reporter Brian Karem was found in contempt for
failing to reveal a source's identity and spent time in jail. Karem v. Priest, 744 F.
Supp. 136, 137 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Reporter Tells Source, Is Freed, L.A. TIMES, June
10, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Reporter]. Karem was released two weeks into his six-
month sentence after his source allowed him to reveal her identity. Id. Both Nina
Totenberg and Timothy Phelps also expressed a willingness to face jail rather than
reveal their source's identity. Lewis, Second Reporter, supra note 4, at A13; Eaton,
supra note 4, at A20.
14. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (quoting Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 688). Courts and legislatures have created numerous privileges, including
the attorney-client, spousal, doctor-patient, and religious privileges. CHARLES T.
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exception because they deny the trier of fact access to possibly
relevant information. 15 Privileges exist, however, because the
values supporting the confidentiality of a relationship can
outweigh the need to present the secret information.'" Advo-
cates of a new privilege, therefore, must show why the confi-
dential relationship that they wish to protect deserves special
treatment.
To protect the confidentiality of reporter-source relation-
ships, many state legislatures have enacted either absolute"
or qualified" press-shield laws. Other states have recognized
reporter-source testimonial privileges in their state constitu-
tions. 19 Many reporters contend, however, that the reporter-
source relationship warrants more than state-law protection.
These reporters believe that a reporter-source testimonial
privilege is firmly rooted in the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.20
MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (John W. Strong ed., student 4th ed.
1992).
15. See generally RICHARD LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH
TO EVIDENCE 645 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing the basic concept of exclusionary rules and
privileges and how they affect the "search for the truth"); MCCORMICK, supra note 14,
§ 72 (noting that privileges "rather than facilitating the illumination of truth....
shut out the light").
16. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 15, at 645; MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 72;
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66
VA. L. REV. 597, 597-98 (1980).
17. A reporter with an absolute privilege cannot be compelled to reveal the
source's identity for any reason. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1982).
18. If the reporter enjoys only a qualified privilege, courts can order the
reporter to reveal the source's identity under certain conditions. See, e.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1992) (providing that a court shall grant
disclosure only if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the information is
relevant to a specific violation of the law, cannot be obtained by alternative means,
and must be disclosed to prevent injustice).
19. Richard Tofel reports that as of 1991, 28 state legislatures had enacted
press-shield laws and courts in another 18 states and the District of Columbia had
recognized some sort of common-law or constitutional press privilege. Richard
Tofel, The Case for a National Reporter's Shield Law, N.J. L.J., Mar. 21, 1991, at 9.
For examples of such laws, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.5a(1) (Supp. 1993) (allowing
disclosure only if the source's identity is essential to an inquiry into a crime punish-
able by life in prison and then only when other sources have been exhausted); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1992) (providing for a qualified privilege described
supra note 18); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (1982) (granting reporters an absolute
privilege not to reveal the identity of their confidential sources); Winegard v.
Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847 (Iowa 1977) (recognizing a qualified privilege based on
the State and Federal Constitutions), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); see also
Glenn A. Browne, Note, Just Between You and Me . . . for Now: Reexamining a
Qualified Privilege for Reporters To Keep Sources Confidential in Grand Jury
Proceedings, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 752-53 (surveying state reporter-source privi-
leges).
20. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 4, at A20. Timothy Phelps repeatedly invoked
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The Supreme Court has addressed whether the First
Amendment mandates a reporter-source privilege once before.
In Branzburg v. Hayes,21 reporters argued that forcing journal-
ists to reveal their sources' identities both inhibits sources
from talking to reporters and forces reporters to censor their
own reporting.22 This chilling effect, the reporters claimed,
prevents journalists from exercising fully their First Amend-
ment rights to gather and report the news.23
Justice White, writing for the Branzburg majority, rejected
the reporters' claim, dismissing the alleged chilling effect as
both "speculative"24 and "uncertain."25 In two dissents, four
members of the Court, Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan,
and Marshall, accepted the chilling effect argument outright,
26
and called for at least a qualified privilege.27 Justice Powell's
"enigmatic" 28 concurring opinion advocated an ad hoc approach
which arguably would allow litigants to present evidence of a
chilling effect in each particular case.29
Although the Branzburg Court ruled against the reporters,
these four opinions left aspects of the issue unresolved. For
example, the Branzburg Court addressed only whether reporters
are obligated to comply with grand jury subpoenas. ° Reporters
the First Amendment to justify his refusal to respond to special counsel Peter
Fleming's questioning. Id. The New York Times published an editorial asking the
Senate to drop its investigation of the Thomas/Hill leaks on First Amendment
grounds. Leaks Nobody Needs to Find, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1992, at A26.
21. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
22. Id. at 682, 693-94.
23. Id. at 682.
24. Id. at 694.
25. Id. at 690.
26. See id. at 736 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 720-22 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
27. Id. at 736.
28. Justice Stewart's dissent dubbed Justice Powell's concurring opinion
"enigmatic." Id. at 725. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart noted that the concurrence
"gives some hope of a more flexible view in the future." Id.
29. Justice Powell argued that
Itihe asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of
a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citi-
zens to give relevant testimony .... The balance of these vital constitutional
and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
Id. at 710.
30. Id. at 667 (noting that the issue was "whether requiring newsmen to appear
and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of press guar-
anteed by the First Amendment").
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were left to wonder whether the Court would accept their claim
to a First Amendment privilege under different circumstances.
31
Further, although the Branzburg majority remained
unconvinced by the argument that forced disclosure chills
sources from talking to reporters and forces reporters to censor
their own reporting,32  it was unclear whether a more
substantial showing of a chilling effect might trigger First
Amendment reporter-source protection.33 Finally, although the
majority rejected the reporters' claim to a qualified First
Amendment privilege in all circumstances, Justice Powell
refrained from doing so. Although Justice Powell joined the
five-justice majority opinion, he also filed a concurring opinion
which emphasized the "limited nature of the Court's holding"
and quizzically argued that courts should evaluate reporters'
claims to a First Amendment privilege on a case-by-case basis.34
Much of the debate about a possible First Amendment
reporter-source privilege has revolved around the proper
interpretation of the various Branzburg opinions. 35  The
31. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 836-39 (noting that linking the opinions of
Justice Powell and Justice Stewart implies that Branzburg adopted a case-by-case
balancing approach and did not reject a First Amendment privilege in all circum-
stances). Dean Marcus claims that
[tihe now widely accepted view of Branzburg ... is that it was limited by the
specific facts presented to the Justices ... and that the case-by-case analysis
must be used by trial judges in "balancing freedom of the press against a
compelling and overriding public interest in the information sought."
Id. at 838 (quoting Zelenka v. State, 266 N.W.2d 279, 287 (Wis. 1978)). See also
Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that, at least in civil cases,
Branzburg left open the case-by-case balancing-of-interests approach), cert. dis-
missed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
32. After noting that the press's claim to a privilege conflicts with the strong
public interest in law enforcement, Justice White's majority opinion stated that
"[elstimates of the inhibiting effect ... are widely divergent and to a great extent
speculative," id. at 693-94, and that the reporters had failed "to demonstrate that
there would be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public." Id. at
693. The existence of an alleged chilling effect was held too "uncertain" to overcome
society's interest in effective law enforcement. Id. at 690.
33. Much of the post-Branzburg commentary criticizes the Court for its failure
to appreciate the claimed chilling effect, at least in particular situations. See, e.g.,
Lindberg, supra note 11, at 342-44 (emphasizing the chilling effect in libel suits);
Malheiro, supra note 12, at 100-01 (arguing that the chilling effect warrants a First
Amendment privilege); David J. Onorato, Note, A Press Privilege for the Worst of
Times, 75 GEO. L.J. 361, 382-84, 386 (1986) (arguing that compelled discovery
inevitably chills sources and that this chilling effect in part justifies a privilege in
criminal libel cases).
34. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709.
35. See Marcus, supra note 11, at 839-41.
SPRING 19931
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earliest post-Branzburg cases tended to draw from the major-
ity opinion, holding that the First Amendment affords the
reporter-source relationship absolutely no protection.36
Beginning in 1974," however, most federal courts and many
state courts began to find that the Branzburg dissents of
Justices Douglas and Stewart, patched together with Justice
Powell's concurring opinion, permitted a qualified privilege in
certain types of cases.38 By 1983, a qualified privilege was
recognized so generally that one commentator found that only
a few judges rejected a First Amendment privilege outright.39
A qualified privilege currently exists in nine of the twelve
circuits.4 °
Recent developments have put these circuit-developed
qualified privileges on shaky ground. In 1987, the Sixth
Circuit rejected any claim that the reporter-source relationship
warrants a First Amendment privilege. 4' Recognizing that the
36. See In re Lewis, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 913
(1975); In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 334 (N.J.) (holding that in a criminal prosecu-
tion, the First Amendment does not allow reporters to refuse to comply with subpoe-
nas requesting either information obtained from confidential sources or the identity
of those sources), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). See generally, Marcus, supra
note 11, at 839; Browne, supra note 19, at 747.
37. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 635-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S.
938 (1974) (arguing that Branzburg applies in criminal cases because the need for
testimony with respect to criminal conduct outweighs the press's interest in keeping
sources' identities secret).
38. Marcus, supra note 11, at 836-40; Tofel, supra note 19 at 9; see, e.g.,
LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986);
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816
(1983); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981);
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Carey, 492 F.2d at 635-36.
39. Marcus, supra note 11, at 841.
40. See, e.g., LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139 (the Fourth Circuit); Burke, 700 F.2d
at 76-77 (the Second Circuit); Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 711-12 (the District of Columbia
Circuit); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594-96 (1st
Cir. 1980); Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 146 (the Third Circuit); Miller, 621 F.2d at
725-26 (the Fifth Circuit); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37
(10th Cir. 1977); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 & n.9 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). In addition, the Eleventh Circuit
inherited the privilege that had been recognized previously by the Fifth Circuit in
Miller. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 1981) (ruling
that the Eleventh Circuit is bound by Fifth Circuit opinions handed down before the
creation of the Eleventh Circuit). The privilege also has been recognized at a
district court level in the Seventh Circuit. Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy
Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1201-04 (N.D. Ill. 1978). The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals has yet to address the issue.
41. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 583-85 (6th Cir. 1987).
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other circuits have adopted a qualified privilege, the Sixth
Circuit nevertheless maintained that Branzburg had rejected
the press's chilling-effect argument in all circumstances.42
Recent Supreme Court dicta also seem to undermine the
reporter-source privilege developed by the circuit courts. In
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,43 for example, the Court
explicitly noted that Branzburg had "rejected the notion that
under the First Amendment a reporter could not be required
to appear or to testify as to information obtained in confidence
without a special showing that the reporter's testimony was
necessary."" These recent developments began a rash of cases
in which the courts have read Branzburg narrowly and have
rejected any claim to a First Amendment reporter-source privi-
lege.45 In particular, these recent interpretations argue that
Branzburg rejected the press's claim to a qualified privilege in
all circumstances.4" This threat to the circuit-developed
privleges compels yet another look at whether the reporter-
source relationship warrants a First Amendment privilege.
42. Id. at 585. Further, the Sixth Circuit refused to follow the lead of other
circuits which had limited Branzburg to criminal cases. Id. at 584 n.6 (discussing
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that Branzburg does not
control in civil cases)).
43. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
44. Id. at 201; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991)
(noting that under Branzburg the First Amendment does not "relieve a newspaper
reporter of the obligation shared by all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena
and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation, even though the reporter
might be required to reveal a confidential source"). At least one court has referred
to University of Pennsylvania in holding that reporters may not avail themselves of
a First Amendment privilege. In Karem v. Priest, 744 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Tex.
1990), reporter Brian Karem used confidential sources to arrange an interview with
an alleged murderer awaiting trial in a jail in San Antonio. Karem later refused to
divulge the names of the sources who had arranged the interview and, although
Karem alleged that their identities were not relevant to the case, the state court
found Karem in contempt. Id. at 137-38. The court denied Karem's writ of habeas
corpus, relying in part upon the University of Pennsylvania Court's reasoning that
Branzburg precluded reporters from claiming a First Amendment privilege. Id. at
137, 142. Karem was released from jail after serving two weeks of his sentence
when his source agreed to let him reveal her identity. Reporter, supra note 13, at 1.
At least one commentator likewise suggests that the University of Pennsylvania
dictum threatens the status of the circuit-created privileges. Tofel, supra note 19,
at 9.
45. See, e.g., Karem v. Priest, 744 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Capuano v.
The Outlet Co., 579 A.2d 469, 474-75 (R.I. 1990).
46. See, e.g., Karem, 744 F. Supp. at 138 (noting that the "precise holding of the
Supreme Court in Branzburg was that there is no First Amendment newsman's
testimonial privilege, either qualified or absolute, arising from the receipt of confi-
dential information, to refuse to answer relevant and material questions asked
during a good faith grand jury investigation"); Capuano, 579 A.2d at 474.
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II. THE DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE: PRIVILEGES AND THE
DOCTRINE OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
Rather than restricting its analysis to an interpretation of
Branzburg and the subsequent cases building upon it, this
Note takes a broader look at the relevant First Amendment
doctrine as a whole. This Part identifies three potential theo-
ries for a constitutionally grounded reporter-source privilege
and evaluates one of them-the theory that the government
may not single out the press for discriminatory treatment.
The other two possible justifications for a reporter-source
privilege are evaluated in Parts III and IV.
A. The Press as an Institution
One popular strategy for advocates of a First Amendment
reporter-source privilege is to claim that the media is a
"Fourth Estate" which plays a constitutionally-designated role
as the guardian of the democracy.4" Therefore, the argument
goes, the press as an institution merits special protections
beyond the free speech protection enjoyed by all citizens."
Advocates claim that confidential sources play an integral part
in the day-to-day activity of the institutional press and that
the First Amendment's Press Clause should protect the
reporter-source relationship accordingly.
49
47. See Justice Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-35
(1975) (discussing the press's role as a fourth institution outside of the government
which operates as an additional check on the three official branches, and adopting
Thomas Carlyle's metaphor of the Fourth Estate, which suggests that the British
Press is the Fourth and most important Estate in Parliament).
48. See Langley & Levine, supra note 12, at 34-40; Lindberg, supra note 11 at
340-44; Malheiro, supra note 12, at 83-84; Onorato, supra note 33, at 366-72.
Justice Stewart, the leading judicial advocate of this position, see generally
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-31 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting), once
argued that "the Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the
Constitution .... [It] extends protection to an institution. The publishing business
is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit constitutional
protection." Stewart, supra note 47, at 633. Timothy Dyk recently argued that the
institutional press serves an instrumental role as a "surrogate for the general
public," and therefore should be allowed greater access to the workings of govern-
ment than the public at large. Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and
the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 935 (1992).
49. See, e.g., Langley & Levine, supra note 12, at 41-50 (arguing for a broad
privilege whenever a source provides information about the government); Browne,
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Despite its rhetorical appeal, this approach suffers from a
serious practical weakness: laws compelling testimony are
generally applicable, and the Supreme Court usually rejects
the notion that the First Amendment's Press Clause affords
professional reporters any special protection from generally
applicable laws.5 ° Members of the press, like everyone else,
are subject to the doctrine of promissory estoppel," and must
obey the copyright laws,52 the National Labor Relations Act,53
and the Fair Labor Standards Act.' The press also may not
restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws,55 and must
pay nondiscriminatory taxes.56
supra note 19, at 741-42; Malheiro, supra note 12, at 84; Onorato, supra note 33, at
384-85.
50. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (holding
that the institutional press must obey the National Labor Relations Act because it
is a general law); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518-19
(1991) (holding that the press can be held liable under the doctrine of promissory
estoppel); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-85 (1972). As one commentator
put it, "[tihe prevailing law sharply rejects . . . the claimed right of press secrecy
.... The high court has consistently ruled that members of the fourth estate do not
enjoy immunity from legal obligations applicable to others." Bruce Fein, Turning
Off Congress' Faucets?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2, 1992, at 22.
That the Court generally has rejected the argument that the Press Clause gives
the institutional press any special substantive First Amendment immunity does not
mean that the Court has written the Press Clause out of the Constitution. As then-
Chief Justice Burger explained in dictum, "[tihe Speech Clause standing alone may
be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express ideas and beliefs, while the Press
Clause focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly and
'comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion.'" First Nat. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799-800 (1978) (quoting Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Burger
continued, stating that "[tihe liberty encompassed by the Press Clause, although
complementary to and a natural extension of the Speech Clause liberty, merited
special mention simply because it had been more often the object of official
restraints." Id. at 800.
51. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2516.
52. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977).
53. Associated Press, 301 U.S. at 132-33.
54. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946).
55. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945).
56. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943). The press's claim for
special treatment arguably has received some support from the Supreme Court. As
one commentator recently noted, members of the institutional press seem to enjoy
some special treatment in cases involving prior restraints, Dyk, supra note 48, at
927 & n.3 (referring to Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)), and defamation.
Id. at 927 & n.6 (referring to Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
768-69 (1986)). Still, these cases of "special treatment" seem to have more to do
with the type of speech or publication involved than with the press's status as an
institution. In Freedman, denying motion pictures the same protection from prior
restraints as newspapers perhaps had more to do with the Court's determination
that movies involve lower-value speech than with the press's status as an
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Of course, this means only that members of the institutional
press, for the most part, enjoy the same First Amendment
freedoms to speak and publish as all Americans.57 As Justice
White remarked in Branzburg, "Freedom of the press is a
'fundamental personal right' which 'is not confined to
newspapers and periodicals.' ,,58 Individual reporters enjoy
First Amendment protection not because they are members of
the institutional press, but because they are citizens.
B. Basing a Privilege on the Freedom of Speech
Journalists and their supporters must base their claims to a
reporter-source privilege on something other than institutional
protection. By briefly surveying the relevant free speech doc-
trine, doctrinal support can be pinpointed for reporters' claims
that a First Amendment reporter-source privilege is necessary
to protect journalists' freedoms to publish and speak.
1. The Content-Based/Content-Neutral Distinction-The
Supreme Court traditionally begins its free speech analysis by
drawing a distinction between "content-based" and "content-
neutral" restrictions.59 Content-based laws are those that
expressly restrict communication because of its meaning; a
institution. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60-61 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that
"films differ from other forms of expression"). Similarly, the Court's statement in
Hepps that "where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure
plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements are
false," 475 U.S. at 768-69, seemingly has more to do with the fact that the publica-
tion concerned a matter of public interest than with the publisher's status as a
member of the institutional media. Both holdings would protect the "lonely pam-
phleteer... as much as ... the large metropolitan publisher." Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
57. The notion that reporters cannot be targeted merely because they are
members of the institutional press will be discussed infra at notes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
58. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450,
452 (1938)).
59. See, e.g., R.A.v. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (holding
that a Minnesota ordinance that prohibited speech based on its content was uncon-
stitutional because the content discrimination was not reasonably necessary to
achieve the municipality's compelling interests); see also Frederick Schauer, Cuban
Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communica-
tions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 785 (1985) (discussing the different standards
applied to incidental and intentional restrictions in speech); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 47-48 (1987) (differentiating the
Court's content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech).
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typical example is a law that expressly prohibits the burning
of the American flag in order to "preserv[e] the flag as a sym-
bol of nationhood and national unity.""° Content-based restric-
tions ordinarily receive the highest First Amendment scrutiny.
As Justice Brennan wrote, "[if there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.""
By contrast, laws that explicitly regulate conduct and not
meaning are dubbed content-neutral. For example, a law that
prohibits noise near a hospital is content-neutral because it
regulates an activity, making noise.6 2 Such a law certainly
would restrict loud speeches, but not because of the messages
that they convey. 3 Instead, the speeches-along with other
loud noises-are restricted because of their noise. 4 Similarly,
a law that compels witnesses to reveal the sources of their
information does not explicitly regulate the content of the
witnesses' testimony, and therefore is content-neutral. Most
content-neutral restrictions do not raise First Amendment
concerns.
6 5
Content-neutral restrictions do implicate free speech con-
cerns, however, if the regulated conduct has both speech and
non-speech elements.6 A classic example of this type of regu-
lation would be a law that prohibits the intentional
destruction of a draft card.6 ' The nonspeech conduct prohib-
ited is the destruction of an identification card issued by the
government. The regulation also implicates speech because
the government arguably is attempting to prohibit a certain
type of protest, namely, the burning of a draft card to protest
the draft. Under an approach first described in United States
60. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989). In contrast, a law that prohib-
its burning anything in a public place would not violate the First Amendment. The
problem with the law in Johnson was that it was "not aimed at protecting the
physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but was designed instead to
protect it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others." Id.
at 411; see generally Stone, supra note 59, at 47-48.
61. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
62. Stone, supra note 59, at 48.
63. Id. at 47 (noting that content-based restrictions limit a communication
because of the message conveyed by the communication).
64. Id. at 48.
65. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706-07 (1986) (holding
that a law penalizing prostitution raises no First Amendment concerns).
66. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. at 702-03.
67. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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v. O'Brien,68 courts faced with a First Amendment challenge to
a content-neutral law must examine whether the government's
motive in passing the regulation is "unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression," that is, courts must determine
whether the law is designed expressly to restrict communica-
tive activities. 69 A content-neutral law designed to suppress
communications (for example, a law that bans the use of
sound trucks in residential neighborhoods), theoretically
receives the same searching scrutiny as a content-based
restriction. °
That content-neutral laws designed to suppress communi-
cations receive the highest First Amendment scrutiny provides
the first cornerstone for the reporter-source privilege that this
Note proposes in Part V. A law in which the government
specifically "target[s] or single[s] out the press"7 1 for discrimi-
natory treatment probably was passed to suppress communica-
tions and accordingly should raise serious First Amendment
concerns.72 As a result, the government may not compel a
68. Id. See also Schauer, supra note 59, at 785; Stone, supra note 59, at 51.
Although O'Brien specifically involved symbolic speech, the O'Brien approach now is
employed more generally to evaluate claims that content-neutral regulations impact
free speech. See, e.g., Cloud Books, 478 U.S. at 702-05.
69. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. For good discussions of the First Amendment
treatment of incidental restrictions on free speech, see Schauer, supra note 59, at
785; Stone, supra note 59, at 48.
70. As noted supra text accompanying note 61, this means that the law will
receive the highest First Amendment scrutiny. See Schauer, supra note 59, at
785-87 & n.24. Professor Stone observes that content-neutral laws having a
communicative impact actually are subject to three distinct standards of review:
deferential, intermediate, and strict review. Stone, supra note 59, at 48-54.
71. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2515 (1991) (holding that the
press is not immune from the doctrine of promissory estoppel).
72. Id. at 2518-19. It is tempting to analogize the Court's approach to the
Press Clause with its approach to the equal protection doctrine: generally applica-
ble laws impacting the press as an institution (as opposed to the press as a speaker)
do not violate the First Amendment, but the First Amendment is violated once the
press proves some sort of intentional discrimination. Similarly, generally applicable
laws that incidentally impact a suspect class ordinarily fail to violate equal protec-
tion, while laws that specifically target a suspect class warrant the highest equal
protection scrutiny. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1975); cf. Douglas
Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 17 (arguing that the
Court in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), effectively applied equal protection analysis in the Free Exercise context);
Schauer, supra note 59, at 788 (analogizing the doctrine of incidental restrictions to
equal protection analysis). The problem with this approach is that it essentially
conveys constitutional status to the institutional press, something that the Court
has been reluctant to do. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05
(1972). A better approach, perhaps, is to view a statute that specifically singles out
the institutional press for unfair treatment as a facially neutral law motivated by a
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reporter to reveal the identity of a confidential source merely
to punish the reporter for being a member of the institutional
press.v3 The Court acknowledged this principle in Branzburg
when it stated that "lofficial harassment of the press under-
taken not for purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a
reporter's relationship with his news sources would have no
[First Amendment] justification. 74
2. Incidental Restrictions on Free Speech: The Cloud
Books Test-The principle that the government may not
harass a reporter merely for being a member of the
institutional press will not alone justify a reporter-source
privilege because compelling a reporter to reveal her source's
identity need not always raise the specter of a government
motivated by antipress animus. A regulation or court order
compelling a reporter to reveal her source's identity ordinarily
is a second type of content-neutral restriction, one that directly
regulates mere conduct and impacts free speech only inciden-
tally.75 For example, discovery laws and laws authorizing a
court to compel testimony are generally applicable. 76 The rule
that litigants have "a right to every man's evidence"77 is
benignly motivated to serve the public interest by having
litigants present all relevant truthful information in court and
not by a governmental quest to suppress either the press or
desire to suppress speech. Targeting the press therefore is analogous to a
redistricting plan that, while neutral on its face, clearly is racially motivated. See
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see also Schauer, supra note 59, at 781
n.15. In Gomillion, the city of Tuskegee, Alabama had changed its districting plan
"from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," 364 U.S. at 340, which
excluded all but four or five of Tuskegee's 400 black voters from the redrawn voting
district without eliminating a single white voter. The Court found that the only
reasonable explanation for the redrawing of the boundaries was impermissible
gerrymandering. Id. at 341. Similarly, a law that specifically targets the press
most likely is motivated by the desire to suppress speech and therefore violates the
First Amendment.
73. See Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518 (noting that the government may not target
or single out the press for discriminatory treatment); see also Branzburg, 408 U.S.
at 707-08 (prohibiting official harassment intended to disrupt a reporter's relation-
ship with her sources).
74. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08.
75. Id. at 681 (stating that cases compelling reporters to respond to grand jury
subpoenas "involve no intrusion upon speech"); see also Schauer, supra note 59, at
787 & n.27.
76. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682 (noting that grand jury subpoenas
apply to citizens generally).
77. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (rejecting President
Nixon's claim to an absolute executive privilege).
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speech. Unintended "incidental restrictions"-like the ones
occasioned by this rule-usually fail to raise First Amendment
concerns at all.78
For the most part, the Court's emphasis on the government's
motive and its reluctance to scrutinize unintended or inciden-
tal restrictions on free speech are sensible.79 As the Supreme
Court noted in Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.:80
[E]very civil and criminal remedy imposes some conceiv-
able burden on First Amendment protected activities. One
liable for a civil damages award has less money to spend
on paid political announcements or to contribute to politi-
cal causes, yet no one would suggest that such liability
gives rise to a valid First Amendment claim. Similarly, a
thief who is sent to prison might complain that his First
Amendment right to speak in public places has been
infringed because of the confinement, but we have explic-
itly rejected a prisoner's claim to a prison environment
least restrictive of his desire to speak to outsiders.81
78. Stone, supra note 59, at 108.
79. As Professor Schauer points out, it is troubling to think "that every owner
of a movie theater, concert hall, bookstore, magazine stand, or newspaper dispens-
ing machine would have a first amendment-inspired claim for a special exemption
from otherwise generally applicable zoning laws." Schauer, supra note 59, at 787;
see also Stone, supra note 59, at 107 (noting that extending the balancing test to all
laws with only an incidental effect on speech "would open up a Pandora's box of
judicial review").
80. 478 U.S. 697 (1986) (upholding New York's decision to close a bookstore
because of prostitution on the premises).
81. Id. at 706 (citation omitted). Commentators generally have agreed that the
distinction the Court draws between incidental and purposeful restrictions makes
some sense. Professor Schauer argues that the viability of the distinction between
regulations having a direct communicative impact and regulations having only an
incidental effect on speech boils down to the distinction between the "positive" and
.negative" conceptions of the First Amendment. Schauer, supra note 59, at 783.
The positive conception accents the positive values of speech; it concentrates on "the
particular advantages, beauties, and purposes served by certain communicative
acts." Id. at 782-83. The negative perspective, on the other hand, focuses less on
the values served by speech and more on the dangers of governmental regulation.
Id. at 781. Under a positive approach, "a reduction in the quantity of speech is a
substantial and primary constitutional harm." Id. at 783. As a result, the distinc-
tion between a law designed to suppress communication and a law having only an
incidental effect on speech is by itself irrelevant. A positive approach focuses on the
effects of a regulation. The negative approach focuses more on governmental
motivation. "Only the intentional restriction calls into question the state's motives,
and if our aim is specifically to prevent the government from having certain
motives, then the intentional restriction involves dangers of a different order." Id.
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Forcing courts to evaluate all of the effects of every
generally applicable law would create an administrative
nightmare. Given the impossibility of evaluating the free
speech implications of every governmental action, the Court
wisely concentrates its limited judicial resources on situations
that pose the greatest threat to free speech: intentional
restrictions.82
Nevertheless, as the Court has acknowledged,83 a blanket
refusal to evaluate the unintended effects of generally
applicable laws can pose serious dangers to free speech. Some
incidental restrictions impair opportunities for expression just
as thoroughly as laws that specifically target
communications." A law zoning a certain area for residential
use, for example, restricts speech just as thoroughly as a law
prohibiting all bookstores in the same area. 5 Aware of this
threat and of the administrative need to limit the scope of
judicial review, the Court has carved out two situations in
which content-neutral laws that incidentally restrict free
speech warrant First Amendment review: (1) where "a statute
based on a nonexpressive activity has the inevitable effect of
at 783. Professor Schauer considers himself an adherent to the negative view. Id.
at 783 n.19.
Professor Stone, although admitting that the distinction between regulations
having direct communicative impact and regulations having only an incidental
effect has "some force," Stone, supra note 59, at 107, nevertheless seems to be an
adherent to the positive view of the First Amendment. As he notes, "the central.
concern of content-neutral analysis is the extent to which content-neutral restric-
tions limit the opportunities for free expression." Id. at 106. To Professor Stone,
"[tihe potential restrictive effect of ... [laws having only an incidental effect on free
speech] is simply too great to disregard them entirely." Id. at 107.
82. Incidental side effects certainly could restrict the quantity or quality of
speech. The intentional restriction of free speech, however, simply "involves
dangers of a different order." Schauer, supra note 59, at 783.
83. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 702-04 (1986).
84. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2522 (1991) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
85. Stone, supra note 59, at 105. Professor Stone provides several examples of
pairs of laws in which the effects of both laws are the same, but the first law
directly restricts communicative activity, whereas the second law has only an
incidental effect. Two of Stone's examples are:
A law that prohibits all parades in order to prevent obstruction of traffic, and
a law that prohibits obstruction of traffic by any means, including parades;
A law that prohibits sound trucks in order to prevent excessive noise, and a
law that prohibits excessive noise, which in practice bans among other things
cars with defective mufflers, jackhammers, and sound trucks ....
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singling out those engaged in expressive activity,"86 or (2)
"where it was conduct with a significant expressive element
that drew the legal remedy in the first place .... ,8 As Pro-
fessor Stone has rephrased this Cloud Books test, incidental
restrictions are subject to a more exacting First Amendment
review only when they either (1) "have a highly disproportion-
ate impact on groups or individuals engaged in first amend-
ment activity,"88 or (2) "penalize expressive activity."
89
Although no cases as yet have applied the Cloud Books test
to the issue of reporter-source privileges, the Cloud Books
analysis of incidental restrictions conceivably could be used to
support a reporter-source privilege grounded in the First
Amendment. First Amendment protection would be triggered
if advocates of a reporter-source privilege could show that
forcing reporters to disclose their sources' identities either (1)
has a high impact on the press's First Amendment rights or
(2) penalizes the press for reporting the news.
III. INCIDENTAL RESTRICTIONS THAT HAVE A HIGH IMPACT ON
FREE SPEECH: THE CHILLING EFFECT ARGUMENT
This Part evaluates whether the first prong of the Cloud
Books test-the "high impact" analysis-justifies a First
Amendment reporter-source privilege. The most popular strat-
egy for advocating a First Amendment reporter-source privi-
lege is to argue that compelling reporters to reveal their
sources' identities inevitably singles out the press, or, in other
words, that compelled disclosure has a "high impact" on the
First Amendment right of reporters to report the news. Jour-
nalists long have claimed that compelling a reporter to reveal
the identity of a confidential source chills the news-gathering
process and therefore hinders the press's ability to report the
news. ° Were the courts routinely to compel disclosure of
86. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. at 706-07 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)).
87. Id. at 706 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
88. Stone, supra note 59, at 108-09.
89. Id. at 109.
90. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 693-94 (1972);
Kloppenberg, supra note 11, at 1636; Lindberg, supra note 11, at 341-43; Malheiro,
supra note 12, at 84; Onorato, supra note 33, at 386-87.
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sources' identities, the argument goes, no source would risk
divulging information to a reporter and the public would be
deprived of newsworthy information.9' Further, a reporter,
knowing that a court may order disclosure, might decide to
suppress newsworthy information either to protect the source
and the reporter-source relationship or to 'avoid the conse-
quences of not revealing the identity of the source.92 Many
journalists, courts, and commentators have argued that the
claimed chilling effect warrants the creation of a First
Amendment confidential reporter-source privilege.93
There are two main strategic hurdles to successfully basing
a First Amendment reporter-source privilege on the claimed
chilling effect.94  The first issue is whether a chilling effect
exists at all. The second concern is whether any such chilling
effect would be sufficiently severe to warrant First
Amendment protection.
1. The Empirical Evidence-Two empirical studies, one
published in 19719" and the other published in 1985,96 have
91. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682, 693-94.
92. Id. at 731-32 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Lindberg, supra note 11, at 342-43;
Malheiro, supra note 12, at 100.
93. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-95; Langley & Levine, supra note 12, at 41 (argu-
ing that "meaningful reporting about government would'be effectively crippled in the
absence of confidential relationships [and that] constitutional protection [should be]
afforded those relationships"); Marcus, supra note 11, at 815-17; Tofel, supra note 19,
at 9; Browne, supra note 19, at 742; Kloppenberg, supra note 11, at 1636; Malheiro,
supra note 12, at 84; Onorato, supra note 33, at 391. Reporter Timothy Phelps
invoked the claimed chilling effect to justify his refusal to reveal the source of his
story about Anita Hill's allegations against Clarence Thomas. Eaton, supra note 4, at
A20. Senate Rules Committee Chairman Wendell H. Ford expressed similar concerns
over a chilling effect to explain why the Committee refused to enforce Special Counsel
Fleming's subpoena. The Senate Shows Some Sense, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1992, at
A34.
94. Although the "impact branch" of the Cloud Books test seemingly would open
the door to arguments that forced disclosure creates a "chilling effect," it is important
to note that the "impact branch" is unlike a straight balancing-of-effects approach.
Under a straight balancing-of-effects approach, courts attempt to articulate, measure,
and compare the competing interests involved in a particular case to determine the
legitimacy of burdening constitutional interests. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513, 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting). The "impact branch" does not permit
such balancing; a court will subject an incidental restriction to First Amendment
scrutiny only after it first determines that the restrictive effect on free speech is large
enough to be called "severe." Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986);
see also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Further, once a court finds the
required 'severe" burden on free speech, it still does not engage in a balancing test.
Instead, the court purportedly applies a 'least restrictive means" test to determine if
the restriction violates the First Amendment. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. at 706-07.
95. Blasi, supra note 12.
96. Osborn, supra note 12.
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attempted to measure whether compelled disclosure under
present law in fact chills speech. Both studies surveyed
reporters regarding their use of confidential sources. Neither
study provides much support for the argument that compelled
disclosure chills speech. The 1971 study, for example, noted
that the "subpoena threat really hinders only a certain
subpopulation of reporters" and has caused only "some losses"
of stories. 98 The 1985 study reported that most of its research
subjects felt that sources were unaffected by changes in the
press shield laws.99 Fewer than one-third of the reporters
surveyed in the 1985 study thought that shield laws were
helpful in gathering news.100
The failure of these studies to demonstrate that compelled
disclosure deters sources from revealing confidential
information is not surprising. When deciding whether to
reveal information to a reporter, a confidential source probably
is more concerned with whether she can trust the reporter
personally than with whether her relationship with the
reporter enjoys a First Amendment privilege.101 Members of
the press have shown themselves to be worthy of a source's
trust; reporters have a long tradition of being willing to en-
dure jail terms rather than reveal their sources' identities. °2
97. For a discussion of the methodological problems inherent in measuring such
an effect, see Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-95 & n.33.
98. Blasi, supra note 12, at 274.
99. Osborn, supra note 12, at 74-75.
100. Id. at 74-75. In fact, less than 20% of the respondents thought that their
coverage was affected adversely by the threat of possible disclosure. Id. However,
"[n]early all the respondents [felt] threatened by the potential diminution of the
present limited and uncertain protection" available to reporters. Id. at 77.
101. Id. at 75-76.
102. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. As one of the reporters surveyed
by Osborn stated, "A reporter's willingness to withstand all pressure to force
disclosure-even at the risk of jail-is worth more in developing such confidence
than any shield law. Episodes [where reporters go to jail rather than reveal a
source's identity] do not lessen the confidence of sources in reporters. They
heighten it." Osborn, supra note 12, at 76.
This admittedly leads to a rather anomalous result. As noted previously, no
privilege is warranted unless forced disclosure of the source's identity produces a
rather large chilling effect. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89. Arguably,
one of the reasons we fail to observe a chilling effect is because reporters gain
sources' trust by their willingness to go to jail. But it certainly is conceivable that
we would begin to see a pronounced chilling effect were reporters as a group to
comply with court orders to reveal their sources' identities. This produces the
bizarre result that the First Amendment reporter-source privilege conceivably turns
on the reporters' willingness as a group to break the law.
SPRING 1993] Reporter-Source Privilege
Further, from a source's standpoint, little difference exists
between a qualified privilege and no privilege at all. In either
situation, even assuming that the source knows the law, she
enters into the confidential relationship knowing that a court
someday may compel the reporter to reveal her identity.
10 3
Under this analysis, the lack of a First Amendment privilege
does little, if anything, to affect the source's willingness to
talk. 104
It is perhaps more surprising that the studies failed to
establish that the threat of compelled disclosure inspires
reporters to censor their own reporting. This is particularly
surprising because the penalty for refusing to reveal a source's
identity often involves spending time in jail.10 5  In addition,
reporters in libel cases might face the dilemma of either
revealing a source's identity or losing a defamation suit.' 6
The fear of these penalties seemingly would cause journalists
to think twice before printing newsworthy information. The
103. With a qualified, as opposed to an absolute, privilege, a source can never be
sure whether a court will compel disclosure. A source truly fearing disclosure
would settle only for an absolute privilege. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
702 (1972) (explaining that a rule of conditional privilege would "reduce the
instances in which reporters could be required to appear, but predicting in advance
when and in what circumstances they could be compelled to do so would be
difficult"). The Court made a similar observation in University of Pennsylvania. v.
EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (rejecting the University of Pennsylvania's claim to an
academic privilege not to reveal peer-review materials). The Court reasoned that
the chilling effect of forced disclosure on the quality of peer review evaluations
would be only slightly greater without a privilege; as the Court pointed out, some
peer evaluations would be disclosed anyway under a qualified privilege. Id. at 200.
104. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 694-95. The Court has suggested other
reasons why a reporter-source privilege is not crucial to newsgathering. For
example, the Court asserted that "quite often, informants are members of a
minority political or cultural group that relies heavily on the media to propagate its
views, publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to the public," id., suggesting
that informants will provide information to members of the media regardless of the
existence of a privilege. Additionally, the Court pointed out that informants
interested in avoiding exposure probably would rely upon the secrecy of the grand
jury and would trust law enforcement and public officials as much as they would
trust reporters. Id. at 695.
It is possible that courts could attempt to compel testimony by imposing heavy
fines on the newspaper itself rather than by jailing the reporter. Notions that a
newspaper's board of directors owes a fiduciary duty to its shareholders might
compel a newspaper to reveal a source's identity to avoid a fine. That such a
scenario eventually might cause a significant chilling effect is possible but merely
speculative at present.
105. See supra notes 13, 44; see, e.g., Karem v. Priest, 744 F. Supp. 136 (W.D.
Tex. 1990).
106. See Lindberg, supra note 11, at 354.
613
614 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:3
1985 survey nevertheless revealed that fewer than twenty
percent of the journalists surveyed felt that their coverage of
news events suffered because present law permits litigants to
compel disclosure.
10 7
Several factors might help to explain why the threats of jail
time or losing libel suits fail to force reporters to censor their
own reporting. First, news stories most often are derived from
numerous sources; reporters, for reasons of journalistic
integrity, tend to avoid relying exclusively on confidential
sources.'0 8 Only a third of the reporters surveyed in the 1985
study claimed that they based a significant portion of an
article solely on information derived from confidential
sources. 10 9  That reporters have multiple sources enables
courts to force litigants to get the relevant information from
these other, nonsecret sources.1' 0 Moreover, authorities with
the power to compel disclosure traditionally have been
sensitive to reporters' needs to maintain the confidentiality of
their relationships to their sources and often are reluctant to
compel discovery."' Thus, courts might be reluctant to compel
disclosure where the source's identity is relatively unimportant
to the issue being litigated." 2  Finally, going to jail for
107. Osborn, supra note 12, at 74-75.
108. Id. at 73. As one commentator notes:
Journalists have other [nonlegal] incentives to be extremely hesitant before
printing a story using confidential sources, and often censor material of their
own accord. The formal rules and informal checks now present in newsrooms
reflect this caution. The public does not trust stories attributed to anonymous
sources and editors are thus cautious about their use.
Kloppenberg, supra note 11, at 1657.
109. Osborn, supra note 12, at 73.
110. Courts have a great deal of discretion to deny disclosure when the infor-
mant's identity is of little probative value. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) & 26(c);
FED. R. EVID. 403.
111. Marcus, supra note 11, at 820. Dean Marcus notes that common law
judges, while rejecting claims to a reporter's privilege, often would find "technical
reasons" for refusing disclosure. Id. Judges who did order disclosure often would
impose weak penalties for failure to comply. Id.
Further, prosecutors might not press a reporter who refuses to testify.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 694 (1972). A reluctance to take action against
the press was shown most dramatically during the recent Nina Totenberg/Timothy
Phelps case where the Senate Rules Committee refused to compel Totenberg and
Phelps to reveal how they learned of Anita Hill's accusations against Clarence
Thomas. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
112. For example, one commentator has argued that the source's identity often
plays only a minor role in a plaintiff's attempt to meet the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), actual malice requirements in libel cases. See
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refusing to reveal the identity of a confidential source simply
does not carry the usual stigma of imprisonment. In fact,
jailed reporters usually enjoy the celebrity status that accom-
panies cause cgl~bre.
113
This is not to say that compelling reporters to disclose their
sources' identities never chills their ability to report the news.
It certainly is possible that subsequent studies will document
a significant chilling effect after all. But even establishing the
existence of a chilling effect would not end the inquiry. As
Professor Blasi wrote, whether "'some' [effect] is 'enough' to
justify a newsman's privilege is a legal rather than empirical
question.""' 4
2. The Elements of "High Impact"-Were journalists to
establish that compelling discovery actually chills their
attempts to report the news, they still would have to establish
that the impact is severe enough to warrant First Amendment
scrutiny."5 This limitation reflects the administrative needs of
courts to avoid the feared avalanche of cases." 6 Of course, the
severity requirement has its own problem: whether the type
or degree of a particular effect is "severe" largely depends
upon whom you ask.
The Supreme Court has considered a number of factors
when evaluating whether the impact of an incidental restric-
tion invokes First Amendment concerns. Incidental restric-
tions on historically open avenues of free expression constitute
one type of effect that the Court regards as severe. For
example, in the public forum cases," 7 the Court found that the
Lindberg, supra note 11, at 348.
113. The publicity surrounding the Brian Karem and the Totenberg/Phelps cases
provide good examples. See supra notes 1-7, 13, 44 and accompanying text.
Admittedly, there is something very disturbing in this reasoning. As attorney Floyd
Abrams wrote:
What kind of legal system is it which would totally deny legal protection to
promises which "must" be made and "must" be kept? The law is not usually so
foolish as to require a "few brave" individuals to be jailed to give effect to
promises which are essential to the functioning of our society.
Floyd Abrams, Letter to the Editor, Protecting Sources Is No Special Privilege, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 1981, at E22.
114. Blasi, supra note 12, at 274.
115. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (holding unconstitutional
an ordinance which prohibited public assembly in streets or parks without a permit
from the Director of Safety).
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First Amendment is implicated when a generally applicable
law affects free expression in "streets, sidewalks, parks and
other similar public places [which] are so historically
associated with the exercise of First Amendment rights that
access to them for the purpose of exercising such rights cannot
constitutionally be denied broadly and absolutely." 18 Unlike
the litigants in public-forum cases, however, the press cannot
claim that the government is taking away something that it
historically has permitted. The position that the reporter-
source privilege is somehow "historically associated with the
exercise of First Amendment rights""9 is untenable. In fact,
as the Branzburg majority noted, history reveals precisely the
opposite; 12  in the past, neither the common law nor the
Constitution has afforded reporters a testimonial privilege.
12'
Another factor in the Court's severity calculation is the
availability of alternative channels of communication. 22  In
118. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968) (holding that peaceful picketing in locations generally open
to the public is protected by the First Amendment). The appeal to history also
warranted First Amendment protection for the press and the public in the so-called
.press access cases." Cases such as Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980) (noting that both the public and the press have a constitutional
right to attend criminal trials), and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596 (1982) (holding that access to criminal trials can be denied only when
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest and only when the remedy is
tailored narrowly to serve that interest), indicate that both the institutional press
and the public have a right to attend criminal trials. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER,
IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 17 (1991) (discussing the historical significance of Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper in the development of a right of access to infor-
mation relating to criminal proceedings). In deciding that the effect on free speech
was severe enough to warrant First Amendment scrutiny, the Court noted that "the
criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public." Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605.
119. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 315.
120. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
121. Id. at 685, 698. In fact, only 17 cases brought between 1911 and 1968
involved a reporter's pledge to keep a source's identity a secret. Browne, supra note
19, at 742 n.29.
122. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (noting that the government may place time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech provided "that they are justified without refer-
ence to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant govern-
mental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information"). The Court has not limited this "alternative
channels of communication" analysis to time, place, and manner cases. In Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986), for example, the Court found that the
'severity of [the] burden [of closing the bookstore] is dubious at best, and is
mitigated by the fact that respondents remain free to sell the same materials at
another location." Id. at 705.
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University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,2 3 for example, the Court
rejected the University of Pennsylvania's claim that it enjoyed
a First Amendment academic privilege against disclosure of
peer review materials used in making tenure decisions.'24 The
Court emphasized that confidentiality of the peer review pro-
cess was not the norm at other universities, indicating that
confidentiality was not vital to the tenure decision-making
process."' In other words, the Court found that "the injury to
academic freedom" was "speculative" because universities have
alternative, nonsecret ways of making tenure decisions.'26
Similarly, reporters need not rely exclusively on confidential
sources to help gather the news; alternative channels of infor-
mation are available. As noted previously, a 1985 study
revealed that although most of the reporters surveyed do, in
fact, rely on confidential sources, only one third of the report-
ers used information obtained from a confidential source "as
the basis for a significant portion of the article."'27
Whether an effect qualifies as "severe" also depends on the
directness of the causal link between the government's action
and its impact on free speech. 2 ' In University of Pennsylva-
nia,'29 the Court rejected the University's claim that forced
disclosure of confidential peer evaluations would have a "chill-
ing effect" leading to a decline in the quality of peer evalua-
tions, in part because the causal link between the EEOC's
subpoena requiring disclosure and the burden to the
University's asserted First Amendment academic freedom
claim was "extremely attenuated."'30  The Court, seemingly
123. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
124. Id. at 197, 201-02.
125. Id. at 200.
126. Id.
127. Osborn, supra note 12, at 73.
128. See University of Pennsylvania, 493 U.S. at 199.
129. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
130. Id. at 199. As Justice Blackmun explained:
[The University] argues that the First Amendment is infringed by disclosure of
peer review materials because disclosure undermines the confidentiality which
is central to the peer review process, and this in turn is central to the tenure
process, which in turn is the means by which petitioner seeks to exercise its
asserted academic-freedom right of choosing who will teach. To verbalize the
claim is to recognize how distant the burden is from the asserted right.
Id. at 199-200. The problem with accepting the University's attenuated claim, the
Court continued, is that the University had failed to distinguish the burden that it
claimed it would suffer from compelled disclosure from the burden that it and
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influenced by the tort-law idea of proximate causation,
required the government action to be closely connected to the
impact on First Amendment rights.13' Thus, to be entitled to
First Amendment protection, a reporter would have to dem-
onstrate that the causal link between the claimed chilling
effect on free speech and the government's action in compel-
ling discovery of a reporter's confidential source was not
"attenuated."
Applying the University of Pennsylvania Court's analysis to
the reporter-source relationship demonstrates that the claimed
chilling effect would be quite attenuated from the govern-
ment's actions. The press argues that compelling discovery of
a source's identity would undermine the willingness of other
sources'to enter into confidential relationships with reporters.
A potential source would fear retaliation from third parties,
possibly including private parties. The reporter-source rela-
tionship, the argument continues, is central to the
newsgathering process, which in turn is central to free speech.
Thus, to inhibit the reporter-source relationship is to harm
free speech. As the University of Pennsylvania Court noted,
"[to verbalize the claim is to recognize how distant the burden
is from the asserted right."
132
others must bear under other generally applicable laws. A generally applicable tax
law, for example, while raising no First Amendment concerns, nevertheless has the
potential to deprive a university of a significant amount of money that it could have
used to bid for prospective professors. The Court doubted whether "the peer review
process is any more essential in effectuating the [University's] right to determine
'who may teach' than is the availability of money." Id. at 200.
131. Id. The Court also found the injury to academic freedom to be "speculative"
as well as "remote and attenuated." Id. The Court indicated a reluctance to
recognize a constitutional privilege because of the uncertainty of the magnitude of
the chilling effect. Id.
132. Id. A finding of attenuation, however, does not necessarily eliminate the
need for First Amendment review. The Court has recognized that burdens that 'are
less than direct may sometimes pose First Amendment concerns." Id. at 199. In
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964), for example, an Alabama statute required
out-of-state corporations doing business in Alabama to provide the names and
addresses of its members. Although the Court concluded that the impact on an
NAACP member's First Amendment right to freedom of association was attenuated
or indirect, compelled disclosure of the members' identities warranted First Amend-
ment scrutiny because disclosure would have an actual, substantial deterrent effect
on membership. Id. at 308.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Cam-
paign Comm. 459 U.S. 87 (1982). The Court found that in light of the history of
private and public harassment of Socialist Party members, campaign contribution
disclosure requirements instituted by the State of Ohio violated the First Amend-
ment when applied to the Socialist Party. Id. at 97-98. The Court reached this
result despite the fact that the chilling effect on the members' First Amendment
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Finally, advocates of a privilege must address the argument
that a chilling effect actually might be beneficial in some con-
texts. Arguably, secrecy is essential to the deliberations of
certain organizations, such as Congressional committees and
appellate court panels.133 A First Amendment reporter-source
privilege is undesirable in contexts where secrecy is important
because the privilege would shield leakers and accordingly
would chill the speech of those involved in secret communi-
cations. The Totenberg/Phelps case, for example, arose
because someone violated Professor Hill's request that her
allegations remain secret. 3 1 Presumably, Hill might not have
offered her information had she known that it would be
leaked.
135
The debate about the existence of a chilling effect no doubt
will continue. Nevertheless, the press to date has failed to
establish clearly that compelled disclosure has a severe impact
on First Amendment rights. An analysis of University of
Pennsylvania indicates that meeting the severity requirement
will not be easy. Reporters wishing to base a reporter-source
First Amendment privilege on the claimed chilling effect face a
difficult challenge.
IV. INCIDENTAL RESTRICTIONS THAT PENALIZE SPEECH
Part III found it unlikely that a reporter-source privilege
could be based successfully on the argument that the claimed
right of freedom of association did not come directly from the government actor. Id.
at 93. Instead, the Court emphasized that "the compelled disclosure of a party's
contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from
either Government officials or private parties." Id. at 93 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976)) (emphasis added). In short, the Court was concerned that
"[clompelled disclosure ... could ... cripple ... [the] party's ability to operate
effectively and thereby reduce 'the free circulation of ideas both within and without
the political arena.'" Id. at 98 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71).
133. See Fein, supra note 50, at 22; see also Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382,
402 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Buckley, J., concurring). After the contents of preliminary
drafts of an appellate opinion had been leaked to the press, Judge Buckley com-
mented that secrecy is crucial to the workings of appellate panels. Id. at 403-04.
134. When Professor Hill contacted the Judiciary Committee, she insisted that
her name not be used. Statement of Senator Joseph Biden, quoted in Lewis, supra
note 1, at A14.
135. "Professor Anita Hill ... would never have offered her affidavit charging
Judge Thomas with sexual harassment without the promise of confidentiality."
Fein, supra note 50, at 22.
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chilling effect qualifies as a "severe" impact under the first
prong of the Cloud Books test. This Part, looking to the sec-
ond prong of the Cloud Books test, observes that compelled
disclosure of a source's identity should receive First Amend-
ment scrutiny whenever the reporter's speech "[draws] the
legal remedy in the first place."'36 This Part examines what it
means to "draw the legal remedy."
On its face, applying the "penalizing speech" branch of the
Cloud Books test appears relatively simple. A court is to
subject regulations to a more searching scrutiny whenever
government officials invoke a content-neutral regulation to
penalize expressive activity. 3 v In United States v. O'Brien,38
for example, the arguably expressive act of burning a draft
card had drawn the legal remedy. 139 In Cloud Books, however,
the Court ruled that New York's decision to close a bookstore
did not implicate the First Amendment because the govern-
ment was penalizing the nonexpressive activity of prostitu-
tion. 40 New York's decision to close the bookstore certainly
affected an expressive activity, but a nonexpressive activity,
prostitution, had drawn the legal remedy.1
4 '
O'Brien and Cloud Books notwithstanding, deciding whether
expressive or nonexpressive activity drew the legal remedy
often proves difficult. When reporters are compelled to testify,
has their speech or has their knowledge of the source's
identity drawn the legal remedy?
A recent case, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,142 helps illumi-
nate the penalization branch of the Cloud Books test. In
Cohen, two newspapers broke their promises of confidentiality
to the plaintiff Dan Cohen by publishing his name as the
source of information relating to a candidate in an upcoming
136. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 706 (1986).
137. Id. at 706-07 & n.3 (referring to Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion).
138. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
139. Id. at 376-77 (acknowledging that draft card burning has both "'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements"); see also Stone, supra note 59, at 109. Professor Stone
argues that the "least restrictive means" test actually amounts to little more than a
rubber stamp. Id. at 50-52. In fact, as Professor Stone remarks, the O'Brien
standard has never resulted in the Court striking down a regulation for failing the
least restrictive means test. Id. at 110-11.
140. In Cloud Books, New York closed down a bookstore because of prostitution
on the premises. In upholding New York's action, the Court concluded that "the
First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement of a public health regulation
of general application against the physical premises in which respondents happen to
sell books." 478 U.S. at 707.
141. Id.
142. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
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gubernatorial election. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment barred Cohen's promissory estoppel
claim against the newspapers. 43
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Blackmun, writing in dissent, agreed with the Minnesota
Supreme Court and argued that allowing Cohen a cause of
action and awarding damages under a promissory estoppel
theory effectively would penalize the press for publishing
Cohen's identity.144 To Justice Blackmun, Cohen was
indistinguishable from Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,145 in
which the Supreme Court prohibited a trial court from impos-
ing liability for the publication of a satirical critique of Jerry
Falwell where actual malice had not been proven.'46 In both
cases, Justice Blackmun was unconcerned with the govern-
ment's motive, and, focusing strictly on the government's
action, perceived what he thought was an impermissible
causal link-there was speech, and the government acted to
restrict it. That the speech in Cohen was merely incidental to
the underlying breach of a promise was inconsequential.'4 7 To
Justice Blackmun, applying promissory estoppel in response to
143. Id. at 2516-17.
144. Id. at 2521-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The newspapers argued that
enforcing the doctrine of promissory estoppel would conflict with the First Amend-
ment principle that the government constitutionally may not punish a newspaper
for publishing lawfully obtained "truthful information about a matter of public
significance . . . absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Id.
at 2518 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
Although Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority that the identity of the
speaker as a member of the press is irrelevant, id. at 2520, he argued that restrict-
ing "truthful speech may [never be sanctioned consistent with the First Amend-
ment [unless doing so is] in furtherance of a state interest 'of the highest order.' "
Id. at 2522 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 103). Writing for the majority, Justice
White dismissed Justice Blackmun's Daily Mail argument because the restrictions
in that case had been content-based restrictions instead of content-neutral rules of
general applicability. The constitutional problem with Daily Mail, he noted, was
that "the State itself [hadi defined the content of [the] publications that would
trigger liability." Id. at 2519. Under the Cloud Books analysis, such distinctions
fall into the upper tier of the O'Brien test and automatically receive the highest
First Amendment scrutiny. Stone, supra note 59, at 47.
145. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
146. Id. at 56.
147. To Justice Blackmun, "the publication of important political speech" is the
claimed violation. Thus, as in Hustler, the law "may not be enforced to punish the
expression of truthful information or opinion." Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S.
Ct. 2513, 2521-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although Justice Blackmun seemed
unconcerned about governmental motive, he nevertheless would require a fairly
direct causal link between the government actor and the suppression of speech.
See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199-200 (1990).
SPRING 19931
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 26:3
the publication was the same as punishing, or at least sanc-
tioning, the newspapers in violation of the First Amend-
ment.'48
Justice White, writing for the Cohen majority, argued that
Hustler was distinguishable because Dan Cohen, unlike Jerry
Falwell, was complaining primarily about a broken promise
and not about the newspaper's publication.'49  Rejecting
Justice Blackmun's mechanical cause-and-effect method,
Justice White's approach instead focused on whether the
government action was motivated by the speech itself. Justice
White seemed to ask: "What is it that bothered the
government enough to take action?" In his Hustler
concurrence, for example, Justice White found that the
government impermissibly "penalized the publication of the
parody." 5 ' In Cohen, the private parties rather than the
government had determined what expressive elements could
not be published.'' First Amendment scrutiny was not
warranted because it was the breach of this self-imposed
agreement, not the fact of publication, that had bothered the
government actor and therefore had drawn the legal remedy.'52
148. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520-22.
149. As Justice White stated, "Cohen is not seeking damages for injury to his
reputation or his state of mind. He sought damages in excess of $50,000 for a
breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered his earning
capacity." Id. at 2519.
150. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (White, J., concur-
ring).
151. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519. Justice White contrasted the situation in Cohen,
where "Minnesota law simply require [d] those making promises to keep them" with
cases where "the State itself defined the content of publications that would trigger
liability." Id.
152. Justice White accordingly seemed to adopt what Professor Schauer calls a
"negative perspective on the first amendment." Schauer, supra note 59, at 783.
"Under a negative view, the focus is not so much on the particular values that are
served by speech as on the particular dangers of its regulation." Id. Under this
negative perspective, couits are primarily concerned with preventing "the govern-
ment from having certain motives." Id. Incidental and unintended effects are not
irrelevant; the negative conception merely holds that the intentional restriction of
free speech "involves dangers of a different order." Id.
Historically, the distinction Cloud Books draws between restrictions on conduct
with a significant expressive element that "drew the legal remedy in the first place,"
and those that do not, has made little difference. Schauer, supra note 59, at
787-88; Stone, supra note 59, at 109-11. Despite the pains the Court went through
to distinguish Cloud Books from O'Brien and its progeny, the Court never has used
the "least restrictive means" test to rule an incidental restriction unconstitutional.
Stone, supra note 59, at 110-11. Nevertheless, the Hustler. decision, particularly
Justice White's concurrence, coupled with both Justice Blackmun's and Justice
White's Cohen decisions, shows that whether or not an expressive element drew the
legal remedy indeed may be important. Despite their disagreement, both Justice
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Justice White's majority opinion in Cohen thus clarifies at
least one aspect of the "penalization" branch of the Cloud
Books test: the penalization branch requires a court to make a
determination of governmental motive. A mere link between
speech and governmental action alone will not warrant First
Amendment scrutiny.
The following two examples illustrate Justice White's
approach. In the first situation, a source reveals to a reporter
some highly classified yet unembarrassing information which
the reporter then publishes. In this situation, the reporter
actually has witnessed a crime-the source's crime of disclos-
ing classified information. As the courts have made clear,
members of the press are not immune from testifying as wit-
nesses to criminal acts. 153  It is true that the government
learned of the source's crime through the reporter's speech.
Yet, the information's unembarrassing content seems to indi-
cate that the crime of revealing classified material, and not
the reporter's speech itself, motivated the government to com-
pel the reporter to testify. Compelling the reporter to reveal
her source's identity would not implicate the penalization
branch of the Cloud Books test.
In the second example, the information that the source leaks
is unclassified, but its publication nevertheless causes great
embarrassment to a government official. If the government
tries to compel the reporter to reveal her source's identity, it
seems more likely now, although we cannot be certain, that it
is the reporter's speech and not the source's identity that has
drawn the remedy. At a heuristic level, the case now begins to
look less like Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. and more like Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.
The first example represents one end of a spectrum. As in
Cohen, we can be fairly sure that the source's underlying
conduct, and not the reporter's speech, has drawn the legal
remedy. The second example represents the other end of the
spectrum. It looks more like Hustler because, arguably, the
reporter's speech and not the source's conduct has drawn the
remedy.
These examples emphasize the procedure courts would have
to follow were they to apply this part of the Cloud Books test
White, Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519, and Justice Blackmun, id. at 2521, agree that in
situations like Hustler, where the State defines the context of the publication that
triggers liability, generally applicable, content-neutral laws having only an inciden-
tal effect on free speech do in fact warrant First Amendment review.
153. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 692 (1972).
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on a case-by-case basis. The crucial question will be whether
it is the particular reporter's knowledge of the source's identity
or the publication of the source's information that bothered the
government enough to compel disclosure of the source's
identity. Only the latter will warrant First Amendment
review.
V. A PROPOSED TEST
Thus far, two key concepts have been distilled from this
overview of First Amendment principles. As discussed in Part
II, government action that targets or singles out the press for
discriminatory treatment raises serious First Amendment con-
cerns. Laws compelling testimony, however, usually pose only
incidental restrictions on free speech, and under the doctrine
described in Cloud Books, such restrictions receive First
Amendment scrutiny only (1) when the press can show that
compelled discovery will have a significant impact on First
Amendment rights or (2) whenever a significant expressive
element provoked the government into taking action or drew
the legal remedy in the first place.'54 Although the first prong
of the Cloud Books test probably cannot support a reporter-
source privilege, the second prong does provide a theoretical
basis for protecting the reporter-source relationship. As
discussed in Part IV, the reporter-source relationship could
warrant protection under the "penalization" branch of the
Cloud Books test whenever it is the reporter's speech, not his
knowledge of the source's identity, that draws the legal
remedy.
A. Rejecting the Ad Hoc Approach
Acknowledging that the reporter-source relationship
warrants First Amendment protection does not necessarily
imply that courts should adopt a reporter-source privilege in
154. Or, as Professor Stone has stated, incidental restrictions receive First
Amendment scrutiny whenever the government uses such content-neutral laws to
penalize expressive activity. Stone, supra note 59, at 109; see also supra notes
86-89 and accompanying text.
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all circumstances. 15  In theory, at least, courts could apply the
principles developed in Parts II and IV on a case-by-case basis.
There are, however, practical reasons for rejecting this ad
hoc approach in favor of a per se privilege. In practice, it will
be far from easy to determine in a given situation whether it
is the reporter's speech or something else that has provoked
the government into taking action. Currently, the only guid-
ance for the courts is a rather inscrutable, and therefore
unhelpful, rule of thumb: whenever the situation looks more
like that in Hustler, the reporter-source relationship receives
First Amendment protection; whenever the situation looks
more like that in Cohen, the reporter-source relationship
receives no protection at all. With no guidance beyond the
Cohen/Hustler distinction, applying the penalization branch of
the Cloud Books test every time a litigant attempts to discover
the identity of a reporter's source would waste judicial
resources and lead to inconsistent results.
A better approach is to examine more closely the various
situations where litigants will attempt to compel reporters to
reveal their sources' identities. The task then will be to
describe the kinds of cases in which there is the greatest
danger that either the reporter's status as a journalist or her
speech, rather than the source's identity, has provoked the
government to take action. Any proposed test will be
evaluated by how well it captures the rather vexing distinction
that Cloud Books draws between situations where it is the
reporter's speech and not his knowledge of the source's
identity that draws the legal remedy.
B. The Proposed Test
This Note proposes that the greatest danger to free speech
arises when the government-as opposed to other
litigants-moves to compel disclosure. The test described in
this Part proposes that courts adopt a per se approach invok-
ing a higher level of scrutiny whenever the government moves
for disclosure of a reporter's sources.
Many courts adopting a qualified privilege have employed a
variant of the test developed by the Second Circuit in Garland
155. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08 (rejecting reporters' claims of a
First Amendment privilege not to testify in front of a grand jury despite acknowl-
edging that the First Amendment prohibits "[olfficial harassment of the press").
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v. Torre.'56 To compel disclosure under Garland, a court must
determine that
(1) the information is clearly relevant to the purpose for
which the movant seeks disclosure;
157
(2) the information cannot be obtained by reasonable
alternative means; 158 and
(3) there is a compelling interest in the information.
15 9
156. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). In Garland,
actress Judy Garland sued CBS for libel over allegedly defamatory statements
appearing in columnist Marie Torre's gossip column. Torre, not a party to the origi-
nal litigation, refused to reveal her source. Although the suit was ultimately
dropped, then-Judge Potter Stewart, writing for the Second Circuit, established
what has come to be known as the Garland test to determine when a court should
compel disclosure of a source's identity. This test has been employed or approvingly
discussed in Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.
1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th
Cir. 1977); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938
(1974); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973).
157. When determining whether to compel disclosure, it is worthwhile to
consider relevance in order to prevent a "fishing expedition." Marcus, supra note
11, at 847-48. The relevance branch of the Garland test reflects Justice White's
concern over "[olfficial harassment of the press undertaken . . . to disrupt a
reporter's relationship with his news sources," Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707-08, as
well as Justice Powell's finding that a reporter may not have to reveal his source's
identity if "called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous
relationship to the subject of the investigation." Id. at 710; see also id. at 707 n.41
(noting that a consideration in authorizing a subpoena pursuant to the Guidelines
for Subpoenas to the News Media is whether the information sought from the
journalist is believed to be "essential to a successful investigation"). Even if the
information given by the source is relevant, the identity of the source often is
irrelevant to the issue being litigated. See, e.g., Bruno, 633 F.2d at 599; Lindberg,
supra note 11, at 347 (arguing that even in defamation cases, the identity of a
source often has little relevance).
158. The second branch of the Garland test requires a court to decide whether
the information could be obtained by alternative means. Generally, courts have
required litigants to find the necessary information elsewhere when at all possible.
See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that "reporters
should be compelled to disclose their sources only after the litigant has shown that
he has exhausted every reasonable alternative source of information"); United
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that if the informa-
tion "is available from a nonjournalistic source, the defendants can obtain the infor-
mation they seek without intruding on the first amendment interests of CBS"), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); see also Marcus, supra note 11, at 850 (stating that
"[v]irtually all judges are in agreement that the moving party cannot seek the
reporter's information or source as a first step."). Courts correctly recognize,
however, that there are limits to the exhaustion principle. In Carey v. Hume, 492
F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974), for example, where a
reporter being sued revealed that his source was an employee of the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA), the court did not require the plaintiff to depose every
UMWA employee. The Carey court nevertheless suggested that deposing 60
employees might have been a reasonable prerequisite to compelling disclosure. Id.
at 639.
159. The third branch of the Garland test requires the courts to determine
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The Garland test certainly protects the journalist-source
relationship where the journalist's speech draws the legal
remedy. The problem with the Garland test, however, is that
it overprotects the journalist by affording the journalist-source
relationship First Amendment protection in all situations. For
example, Garland will protect the journalist-source relation-
ship even when a movant is a nongovernment party who is
genuinely motivated to discover information necessary for her
case. This outcome is undesirable because it infringes upon a
litigant's attempt to present relevant information in court,
even when the reporter's claim of privilege is not supported by
the First Amendment doctrine discussed in Parts II and IV.
The test proposed by this Note better reflects the principle
that the Supreme Court drew in the penalization branch of the
Cloud Books test, namely that the government may not use
content-neutral laws to penalize speech.
This Note therefore proposes the following modification to
the Garland test. Assuming relevance, a court should compel
a reporter to reveal her confidential source's identity unless:
(1) a government actor (or a proxy) is moving to compel
the reporter to reveal the source's identity, and;
whether there is a compelling interest in revealing the information. The court must
determine whether the source's identity is of "great importance to the disposition of
the case," Marcus, supra note 11, at 849, or "essential to a fair trial." Id. at 849
(quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 430-31 (Va.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 996 (1974)). Naturally, the most compelling cases arise in the criminal con-
text, particularly when a reporter's privilege interferes with a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial. See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation,
Privilege of Newsgatherer Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources or Information,
99 A.L.R.3d 37, 60-61 (1980) (noting that courts generally will deny or uphold
reporters' claims of privilege based on whether the disclosure of the source is
essential to a criminal defendant's defense). Courts have found the need for the
source's identity sufficiently compelling to warrant disclosure in civil cases as well.
See, e.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding
that plaintiff in a libel suit could compel discovery of the identity of a journalist's
source where the identity of the source was necessary for the plaintiff to prove the
defendant's malice), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631
(D.C. Cir.) (holding that the identities of the appellant's sources are critical to the
appellee's claim where the plaintiff in a libel case had the burden of proving the
defendant's malice), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
Other courts have developed more complicated variations of the Garland test.
Dean Marcus notes that one judge describes a five-part analysis in the criminal
context examining (1) the potential chilling effect on future news stories, (2) the
public interest served by disclosure, (3) the existence of alternative sources of
information, (4) the relevance of the inquiry, and (5) the impact of the process on
the rights of others. Marcus, supra note 11, at 847-48 (citing Rosato v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 238-39 (1975) (dissenting opinion), cert denied, 427 U.S.
912 (1976)).
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(2) the reporter's speech (instead of her knowledge of the
source's identity) or the reporter's status as a member
of the media is a motivating factor in the government's
decision to move for disclosure.
If either (1) or (2) is not satisfied, the court should reject the
reporter's request for a special reporter-source privilege. Only
if both (1) and (2) are satisfied should the court proceed to
apply the Garland test.6 °
C. The Government /Nongovernment Distinction
The first part of the proposed modification attempts to
exclude a category of cases where the government is not a
party, because these cases are unlikely to implicate the
penalization branch of the Cloud Books test. As the debate
between Justices White and Blackmun in Cohen'6' made clear,
under the penalization branch of the Cloud Books test, the
First Amendment is implicated only if it is speech that
provoked the government into action.'62 The government in
Cohen merely had enforced the parties' self-imposed
agreement; the court's action was motivated by a breach of a
promise and not by the speech itself.
63
160. An argument against the proposed test is that although it affords the press
less protection than it enjoys under the Garland test, the proposed test nevertheless
affords the press more protection than is warranted under Cloud Books. There are
numerous possible situations in which a reporter would enjoy a qualified privilege
even though her source's identity should be discoverable under the principles
outlined in Cloud Books. One example is where a reporter publishes classified
military secrets received from a confidential source. A prosecutor attempting to
investigate the leak and prosecute the leaker would have to overcome the reporter's
qualified privilege not to reveal the source's identity. It is important to remember,
however, that the privilege advocated is not absolute. The government ordinarily
would have no trouble meeting the requirements of the proposed test in this situa-
tion. The prosecutor accordingly would be permitted to discover the leaker's
identity and the crime could be prosecuted.
161. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 142-54.
163. Of course, there may be some cases where the government is not a party and
the "penalization" branch of the Cloud Books test is implicated nonetheless. Situa-
tions could arise where the court itself, as a government actor, is motivated primarily
by the reporter's speech to compel the source's identity. Such situations, although
raising First Amendment concerns, would fail to receive heightened scrutiny were
courts to adopt the per se approach advocated in this Note. This, of course, is merely
one example of the more general problem with employing bright-line rules rather than
examining all of the First Amendment implications on a case-by-case basis.
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The first modification accordingly proposes that courts
refuse to subject motions to compel a source's identity to
higher First Amendment scrutiny unless the government
attempts to force a reporter to reveal his source's identity. If
Cloud Books directs courts to ferret out cases where speech
provokes the government to take action, then those cases are
most likely relevant. Although nongovernment litigants
certainly could attempt to compel disclosure as a way of
retaliating against a reporter for her speech, the debate
between Justices White and Blackmun in Cohen makes clear
that the penalization branch of the Cloud Books test applies
only when the government penalizes speech." 4
This is not to say that it is the reporter's speech that draws
the government's remedy every time, or even most of the time,
that the government moves to compel a source's identity. Part
2 of the proposed modification reflects the need to permit the
government to compel discovery when it is motivated primarily
by the source's identity and not by the reporter's speech or
status as a member of the institutional press. Nevertheless,
the proposed test reflects the reality, as the Nina
Totenberg/Timothy Phelps episode arguably reveals, that
whenever the government moves for disclosure there is a very
real danger that the government is motivated by a desire to
punish the reporter, either because he is a reporter or because
of his speech." 5 As two commentators observed recently, "[ilt
can reasonably be presumed that once the law affords a public
official a mechanism to invoke for such improper purposes, it
will be so invoked, at least on some occasions." '166 The courts
should focus their attention on these occasions.
Nevertheless, this Note advocates a legal test and therefore must presume tacitly that
judges will apply the test in good faith. Even in cases where a judge is biased against
the media, reporters will not be without a remedy because judges may not compel
disclosure as a means of harassing the litigants or the witness. See, e.g., Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972).
164. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517.
165. See, e.g., Leaks Nobody Needs to Find, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1992, at A26
(suggesting that although the government knows that journalists will not reveal
their sources, the government still might try to force journalists to reveal them
anyway, simply to "harass and haze").
166.. Langley & Levine, supra note 12, at 46.
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D. The Reporter /Nonreporter Distinction
Drawing a line between government and nongovernment
movants fails to explain why only reporters and not ordinary
citizens should benefit from First Amendment protections. It
certainly is conceivable that the desire to "penalize" the speech
of an ordinary citizen could prompt the government to invade
an ordinary citizen's confidential relationships. 16 7 Nonetheless,
several factors support the distinction that the proposed modi-
fication draws between reporters and others.
First, compelling someone to reveal the source of her infor-
mation usually will be more burdensome to a reporter than to
a nonreporter. Nonreporters faced with a court order to com-
pel the identity of a source most likely will reveal the source's
identity. That the journalists' creed prohibits reporters from
disclosing their sources" 8 makes it more likely that a reporter
will decide to face the personal consequences, including spend-
ing time in jail, of not disclosing the source's identity. Fur-
ther, because journalists are willing to face the consequences
of nondisclosure, attempts to compel disclosure more likely
will be mere pretexts designed to send the reporter to jail.
The second reason to distinguish between reporters and
nonreporters is that the speech of members of the institutional
press usually reaches a much wider audience than the speech
of nonreporters. Government officials accordingly are much
more likely to be angered or embarrassed by disfavorable
speech broadcast nationwide than they are by an individual's
speech before a small group. As the recent Totenberg/Phelps
case arguably revealed, the government's decision to compel a
reporter to testify is more likely to be motivated out of the
government's embarrassment or anger over the reporter's
speech.' 9
The final reason to distinguish between reporters and
nonreporters comports with the well-established notion 170 that
167. For example, a government official might wish to punish a whistle-blower
who passes damaging information to a consumer group, or the government might
wish to punish a spy who passes confidential information to a foreign official.
168. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 11, at 815-16 (noting that the American News-
paper Guild Code of Ethics prohibits reporters from disclosing the identities of
confidential sources).
169. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 7, at A18 (claiming that the investigation "was
begun by the Senate in response to the anger, largely from Republicans" over
Totenberg's and Phelp's news reports).
170. See supra Part II.
630
Reporter-Source Privilege
the government may not compel a reporter to disclose the
identity of his confidential source merely because of the
reporter's status as a member of the institutional press.' 7 ' As
Justice White noted in Branzburg, rulings that specifically
target the press for harassment would raise serious First
Amendment concerns. Although he rejected the press's chill-
ing effect argument, Justice White did note that "grand jury
investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good
faith, would pose wholly different issues for resolution under
the First Amendment." 72
CONCLUSION
Reporters long have invoked a claimed chilling effect to justify
their claims that the reporter-source relationship warrants a
First Amendment privilege. This strategy suffers from many
serious weaknesses, but the main weakness is that its success
depends on an empirically unsupported assertion. This Note
accordingly rejects the chilling-effect approach and instead
focuses on the government's motive in compelling a reporter to
reveal the sources of her information. The proposed qualified
privilege has the advantage of being based on two well-estab-
lished principles: (1) that the government may not target or
single out the press for discriminatory treatment, and (2) that
the government may not use content-neutral laws to penalize
speech.
The test proposed in this Note does not entirely avoid the
problems involved with basing a privilege on empirical facts. It
is grounded in the assumption that, left unbridled, government
officials will compel disclosure for impermissible reasons often
enough to warrant the creation of a prophylactic rule. That
assumption, however, at least comports with the notion
inherent in our constitutional framework that those in control of
the coercive mechanisms of government pose the greatest threat
to individual liberty. It also comports with the notion that
although otherwise innocuous government action can have the
unintended effect of restricting opportunities for free speech, the
dangers to free speech are greatest when the government acts
intentionally.
171. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
172. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
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